“Friendship is found only among the wise, for only they can share one another's goodness.”
— Zeno of CitiumStoic doctrine on friendship reported in Diogenes Laertius 7.124; approximate English rendering, attribution to Zeno uncertain
Commentary
This doctrine, reported in Diogenes Laertius, holds that true friendship is possible only between the wise, since only they share a common understanding of the good. The claim distinguishes between ordinary affection, which may be based on utility or pleasure, and the genuine friendship that rests on shared virtue. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, explain how the Stoic theory of friendship depends on their account of the wise person and the unity of virtues, so that friendship is a form of moral community. Malcolm Schofield argues that the Stoic conception of friendship expanded into the wider idea of a cosmopolitan community of the wise, which supported their political ideals. Brad Inwood notes that the doctrine raised difficulties about the relation between friendship and the ordinary duties of life, and that the Stoics accepted a degree of affection toward non-wise people. Julia Annas observes that the Stoic account of friendship drew critical comparison with Aristotle's treatment in the Nicomachean Ethics. The English is approximate, and the Greek should be consulted before quotation, since the report in Diogenes Laertius is brief.
Commentary
This doctrine, reported in Diogenes Laertius, holds that true friendship is possible only between the wise, since only they share a common understanding of the good. The claim distinguishes between ordinary affection, which may be based on utility or pleasure, and the genuine friendship that rests on shared virtue. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, in The Hellenistic Philosophers, explain how the Stoic theory of friendship depends on their account of the wise person and the unity of virtues, so that friendship is a form of moral community. Malcolm Schofield argues that the Stoic conception of friendship expanded into the wider idea of a cosmopolitan community of the wise, which supported their political ideals. Brad Inwood notes that the doctrine raised difficulties about the relation between friendship and the ordinary duties of life, and that the Stoics accepted a degree of affection toward non-wise people. Julia Annas observes that the Stoic account of friendship drew critical comparison with Aristotle's treatment in the Nicomachean Ethics. The English is approximate, and the Greek should be consulted before quotation, since the report in Diogenes Laertius is brief.