“Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws.—The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. And in both cases there are similarities. Think of how we use the word 'slab'! The language-game is thus the totality of the language and the actions into which it is woven.”
—
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Philosophical Investigations (1953), Part I, §§ 11-12; edited by G.E.M. Anscombe & R. Rhees, Basil Blackwell
Commentary
Wittgenstein's mature work emphasizes the practical, diverse uses of language. Words do not have single, essential meanings; their meaning is their use in specific contexts ('language-games'). This overturns the picture theory from the Tractatus.
The implications are profound: meaning is conventional and contextual, not essential. 'Love' means differently in poetry, physics, psychology, prayer. Understanding a word means knowing its use, not grasping its essence. This influenced ordinary language philosophy, speech-act theory, and pragmatics. It undermines philosophical puzzles created by assuming a single essence to words that actually have multiple uses.
Commentary
Wittgenstein's mature work emphasizes the practical, diverse uses of language. Words do not have single, essential meanings; their meaning is their use in specific contexts ('language-games'). This overturns the picture theory from the Tractatus.
The implications are profound: meaning is conventional and contextual, not essential. 'Love' means differently in poetry, physics, psychology, prayer. Understanding a word means knowing its use, not grasping its essence. This influenced ordinary language philosophy, speech-act theory, and pragmatics. It undermines philosophical puzzles created by assuming a single essence to words that actually have multiple uses.