“Paradigm choice involves more than a mechanical deduction from neutral evidence.”
— Thomas KuhnInterpretive summary of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), chapters IX and XII; not a direct quotation

Commentary

Kuhn's account of paradigm choice challenges the idea that competing scientific frameworks can always be ranked by applying a single, fully neutral algorithm. Scientists may disagree about the importance of particular problems, the interpretation of experimental results and the standards by which explanatory success should be judged. Such disagreements can persist even when the participants are informed, competent and committed to scientific inquiry. This does not entail that theory choice is arbitrary. Evidence, accuracy, consistency, scope and other scientific values continue to matter, although their relative weight may be disputed. The philosophical issue is therefore how rational judgment operates when shared standards do not determine a unique outcome. This interpretation is more precise than the claim that Kuhn rejected scientific rationality or believed that evidence is irrelevant to scientific change.